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Power of the Korean Film Producer: Dictator Park Chung Hee’s Forgotten
Film Cartel of the 1960s Golden Decade and its Legacy
Ae-Gyung Shim and Brian Yecies1
Key words: Korean cinema, film production, film policy, Park Chung Hee, Shin Sang-ok
After censorship was eliminated in 1996, a new breed of writer-directors created a canon of
internationally provocative and visually stunning genre-bending hit films, and new and established
producers infused unprecedented venture capital into the local industry. Today, a bevy of key
producers, including vertically integrated Korean conglomerates, maintain dominance over the film
industry while engaging in a variety of relatively near-transparent domestic and international
expansion strategies. Backing hits at home as well as collaborating with filmmakers in China and
Hollywood have become priorities. In stark contrast to the way in which the film business is
conducted today is Korean cinema’s Golden Age of the 1960s – an important but little-known
period of rapid industrialization, high productivity and clandestine practices. To develop a fuller
understanding of the development of Korean cinema, this article investigates the complex interplay
between film policy and production during the 1960s under authoritarian President Park Chung
Hee, whose government’s unfolding censorship regime forced film producers to develop a range of
survival strategies. A small but powerful cartel of producers formed alliances with a larger cohort
of quasi-illegal independent producers, thus – against all the odds – enabling Korean cinema to
achieve a golden age of productivity. An analysis of the tactics adopted by the industry reveals the
ways in which producers negotiated policy demands and contributed to an industry “boom” – the
likes of which were not seen again until the late 1990s.
Power of the Producer
Since the early 1990s, Korean film producers have been shaping the local film industry in a variety
of ways that diverge from those followed in the past. A slew of savvy producers and large
production companies have aimed to produce domestic hits as well as films for and with
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Figure 1. Musa The Warrior
(2001). This large-scale
historical epic was shot in
China and Mongolia over a
nine-month period with
massive battle sequences and
dialogue recorded in three
languages. Image courtesy of
Madman Entertainment.
Hollywood, China, and beyond, thus leading the industry to scale new heights.2 They differ
markedly from those producers and companies that, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, were
primarily focused on profiting from the importation, distribution and exhibition of Hollywood
blockbusters and Hong Kong martial arts films in Korea. From the 1990s, Korean cinema
benefitted from a comparatively new level of transparency and efficiency that family-run
conglomerates (chaebols in Korean) and other financial institutions brought to the local film
industry after they began to see the film business as a good investment – despite the impact of the
1997-98 Asian economic crisis.
In 2001, representative producer Tcha Seung-jai – founder of Sidus Pictures (now SidusFNH) and
former chairman of the Korea Film Producers’ Association – opened an important pathway
between the Korean and Chinese film industries when he and writer-director Kim Sung-soo shot
the historical epic Musa The Warrior (2001) as a co-production in Northeast China. Musa was the
most expensive Korean film budgeted at the time, thus establishing Tcha’s reputation as one of
Korea’s most powerful and ambitious producers in Chungmuro – the centre of Korea’s film
industry.3 In 2006 and again in 2007, Tcha was selected by his professional colleagues as the most
influential person in the industry, acknowledging his management of genre hits such as Girls' Night
Out (1998), Save the Green Planet (2003), Memories of Murder (2003), and A Dirty Carnival
(2006), as well as his mentoring of countless junior staff who are now working at the center of the
industry.4
A significant part of the producer mix today is the vertically
integrated group of investor-distributors CJ Entertainment,
Showbox and Lotte Entertainment, that is, powerful corporate
executive producers who now monopolize all aspects of the
industry. They have more or less cut traditional producers like
Tcha out by forming their own relationships with bigger directors.
As a result of their size, exhibition chains, and ties to the corporate
media and financial institutions, together these executive producers
have successfully exerted more influence than any single producer.
The group’s power and position was considerably enhanced after
they resuscitated the industry following the recession it underwent
in 2006 thanks to illegal downloading and piracy, and a succession
of unsuccessful films. This was at a time when the power of
individual producers such as Tcha, and others such as Lee
Choon-yun (Cine2000), Jaime Shim (Myung Film), Oh Jung-wan
(bom Film), and Shin Chul (Shin Cine), had begun to wane, partly
due to a decline in investor confidence caused by the loss of
international pre-sales and the erosion of ancillary markets. Also,
several of these traditional producers were hit hard by their poor
decisions to list their companies on the stock market through
backdoor means. CJ Entertainment, which launched its China
branch in mid-2012, now leads the pack with its corporate
production, distribution and sales, and actor management services,
as well as an increasing number of multiplex cinemas in Korea and
a smaller number in China (all operating under the brand-name
CGV).5
These corporate/executive producers have ushered in a new level of ruthless efficiency in the film
business by maintaining and fine-tuning proven pre-production and marketing planning techniques
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– core elements of “high-concept” filmmaking, which in turn have attracted new banking and
venture capital investors. Their efforts have had the dual effect of generating increased capital and
also ensuring accountability to their shareholders and audiences rather than pandering to the whims
of auteur filmmakers. Their diverse business strategies and achievements have mediated the risks
associated with previous financial strategies involving self or family funding, private loans, and
pre-sales from regional distributors/exhibitors, thus redirecting the impetus of the industry in new
directions. In sum, the so-called power of the producer – as opposed to the power of writer-
directors such as Im Sang-soo, Kim Jee-woon, Hur Jin-ho, Lee Chang-dong, Park Chan-wook,
Bong Joon-ho, and Kim Ki-duk – has reached new heights in Korea during the 2000s by their
willingness to finance globally marketable films and encourage talented young directors to make
them.
The power behind the corporate producer has become even more evident with the recent news that
producers JK Film (in conjunction with CJ Entertainment) had fired auteur Lee Myung-se – the
acclaimed writer-director of notable films such as M (2007), Duelist (2005), Nowhere to Hide
(1999), and Gagman (1989) – mid-stream from the 2012 production of the spy-comedy Mister K.
According to industry sources, JK Film and Lee had divergent views on artistic and legal issues.
6
Lee was replaced with rookie director Lee Seung-joon (who had assisted on the blockbuster films
Haeundae/Tidal Wave (2009) and Quick (2011)), thus sending a clear message about the limits of
artistic freedom that producers are willing to extend to a director.
7
With the increasing power of the producer in the contemporary Korean cinema in mind, this article
focuses on a very different but pivotal period when a range of dynamic production strategies –
including creative responses by filmmakers to government policy – contributed to an industry
“boom” in the 1960s. Given the significant impact of this period of rapid industrialization on this
past decade, it is surprising how little attention it has been given in previous studies.
Earlier studies highlight the frenzy of production during the 1960s, paying tribute to the rise of
auteur directors and the memorable films they made.8 This was a period when Korea experienced
rapid progress in industrialization and policy development, as well as in the production of
entertainment for the masses. A large number of productions that stemmed from a seemingly
limitless source of creative energy focused the spotlight on a coterie of passionate filmmakers and
their artistic achievements. Although these historiographical studies provide extensive details about
the formation of the nation’s cinema in artistic terms, they are less successful in providing an
adequate political-economic perspective on the industry as a whole. They obfuscate information
about the dodges and occasional acts of resistance engaged in by producers and others further
down the industry food chain. By contrast, close attention to the often seamless connections
between policy and industrial and artistic factors will prove to be the key to understanding how this
cinematic golden age was built and buttressed.
Perhaps even more surprising is the near-complete omission of cultural policy and the development
of South Korea’s creative and cultural industries in more recent scholarship on Park Chung Hee.9
Despite the enormous amount of information available, these studies lack a sustained discussion of
the central roles that film and media played in the government’s well-documented national
industrialization strategy and policy.10 In some ways, the present article is the missing chapter in
the Park Chung-hee story.
Hypergrowth of the Propaganda Factory 
On 16 May 1961, General Park Chung Hee led a military coup that successfully seized control of
http://japanfocus.org/-Brian-Yecies/3875?rand=1356367174&...
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Figure 2. Obaltan film
advertisement from Donga
Daily 21 October 1963: 4.
Obaltan is director Yu
Hyun-mok’s most
well-known film. Yu used
montage and sound effect as
a medium to capture the
run-down post-war Korean
society. At the time of its
release, the film was
considered to be a watershed
in Korean cinema for its rare
attempt to capture a realistic
picture of Korea (Chosun
Daily 28 April 1961: 4) – that
is, the theme, mise-en-scène,
and visual style of ‘aesthetics
South Korea. Within months of its abrupt rise to power, his military government had succeeded in
systematizing its near-total administrative control over all film production, distribution (importing
and exporting), and exhibition. This process began with the creation of the Ministry of Public
Information (MPI) on 20 May 1961, the National Film Production Centre (NFPC) on 22 June
1961, and the Motion Picture Law (MPL) on 20 January 1962 – all within the first few months of
the administration coming to power. The MPI was tasked with the role of coordinating all film,
print and radio broadcasting media campaigns.
Almost immediately, the film industry, which was experiencing a new-found creativity since the
end of the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) with accomplished artfilms such as Yu
Hyun-mok’s Obaltan/Aimless Bullet (1960; see Figure 2), was reduced – both literally and
figuratively – to the status of a propaganda factory in which all productions were classed as either
“hard” or “soft” propaganda. They were to become key tools in what one critic described as
“campaigns of assault” and “campaigns of assistance” respectively.11 The regime achieved these
aims first by consolidating the number of feature film production companies from 76 to 16 in 1961
and then by launching two new initiatives.
The first was the National Film Production Center (NFPC),
established in June 1961 to produce newsreels and cultural films
(munhwa yeonghwa, documentary or narrative films delivering
specific political messages), and to distribute these materials
through commercial cinemas. The NFPC grew out of the Film
Department of the Bureau of Public Information (BPI) that had
been established in 1948 under the Syngman Rhee government
(1948-1960).
The second initiative was the Motion Picture Law (MPL), which
guided the production of propaganda feature films with a heavy
hand. The MPL conveniently adopted the oppressive contents of
the Chosun Film Law such as production control, the import quota
system, script censorship, and the producer registration scheme
outlined in 1941 by the Japanese colonial government in Korea,
applying them on a wide scale in order to control Korea’s
burgeoning film industry.12 All these developments and precedents
worked hand-in-hand to control the film industry. The
government’s ultimate intention was to construct a studio system
that operated in similar ways to Hollywood studios, but with an
authoritarian twist.
In January 1962, the military government promulgated its first film
policy through the MPL, imposing twenty-two wide-ranging
measures relating to censorship fees, screening permits, producer
registration, and importing, exporting and exhibiting films. These
measures applied to the entire Korean film industry, with heavy
fines or imprisonment for non-compliance.13 The MPL consisted
of three main components: the Producer Registration System
(hereafter PRS), import regulations and censorship guidelines.
Relentless enforcement of these three elements enabled the MPI to
effectively control the film industry (particularly producers) by
means of a system of “carrots on sticks”.14
http://japanfocus.org/-Brian-Yecies/3875?rand=1356367174&...
4 of 23 24/12/12 8:29 PM
of devastation’, while other
films, mostly melodramas,
had little reference to real
life.
Figure 3. Park Chung Hee
presenting distinguished film
director and producer Shin
Sang-ok with the Best Film
award at the 9th Asian Film
Festival in Seoul (launched
in Tokyo in 1954, and now
called the Asia-Pacific Film
Festival). This event, which
closed pointedly on the
one-year anniversary of
Park’s military coup d'état,
was coordinated by Shin, a
leading exponent of the Park
regime’s industrialization




figurehead at this time.
Donga Daily 17 May 1962: 3.
Through the PRS, the government compelled all producers,
including those remaining following the forced consolidation in
1961 and others interested in joining this elite group, to register
with the MPI. According to the MPL, each applicant for
registration had to meet specific criteria for equipment and
personnel: ownership of a 35mm film camera and 50 KW lighting
kits, as well as securing contracts with at least one experienced engineer or technical expert and
two actors with established careers. Following the introduction of the law, these relatively liberal
requirements enabled all 16 of the consolidated producers, plus an additional five that also met the
criteria, to register under the new system.
However, in 1963 amendments to the MPL introduced stricter
criteria, making it tougher for Korea’s 21 existing producers to
maintain their registration status. Each registered producer was
now obligated to operate a permanent studio (approximately 7,100
sq feet in size) equipped with three 35mm film cameras, 200 KW
lighting kits, and a sound recorder. Contracts with three directors,
three cinematographers, one recording engineer, and ten actors per
studio also became mandatory, requirements which in turn gave
registered producers control over directors, actors, and other
technicians. Additionally, each company was required to maintain
a rigorous production schedule of 15 films per year and to engage
in the import and export of films.
This forced merger between its production and distribution arms
consolidated the industry even further. Almost overnight, a “studio
system” resembling a factory assembly line had been born. Korea
now had six major film companies – a cartel – that suddenly found
themselves in possession of exclusive privileges. The financial
power and charismatic authority of those in the inner circle
increased over time as they became the heart and foundation of all
industry activities.
There were three types of registered (i.e. authorized) producers
operating during the 1960s: producers in the traditional sense;
producers with an importing background; and short-term
producers.15 Those in the first group, such as Shin Film,
Geukdong, Hapdong, Taechang, and Hanyang, followed the
original agenda of the PRS to the letter, treating production as their
primary business and film importing as a sideline.
The second group, represented by Hanguk Yesul and Segi Sangsa,
which had begun their import businesses as far back as 1953,
prioritized importing over production. Under the PRS, they had to
transform themselves into producers to preserve their professional
status. Due to their limited production expertise, the firms in this
group relied heavily on working with independent producers by illegally subcontracting and selling
production rights to them.
The third group consisted of smaller registered producers including Shinchang, Aseong and
Daeyoung; although they managed to become members of the Korean Motion Picture Producers
http://japanfocus.org/-Brian-Yecies/3875?rand=1356367174&...
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Association, they failed to maintain their registered status as government requirements became
tougher. Their core business was working with the independent producers and administering the
necessary paperwork for making films. This type of registered producer was often described as “a
real estate agency”.16
Rise of the Cartel and the Coalition of the Willing
The systematization of the PRS threw up a cartel of producers, who operated from the industry’s
center. Within this elitist system, registered producers maintained direct lines of communication
with the MPI and other industry participants. Contributing covertly to the industry’s productivity
was a slew of unauthorized independent producers and importers who were more than willing to
help the cartel manage their demanding workloads, in particular their ever-increasing registration
requirements. A small army of exhibitors, operating across Korea’s 13 separate provinces, enabled
these various practitioners – both elite and “illegal” – to keep the industry afloat by investing in
productions through pre-sales.
Film financing was largely sourced from savvy exhibitors who invested in a production in return
for the exclusive rights to distribute and screen the film across multiple provinces. Competition
was fierce, as by law only six prints of a given film were allowed to circulate nationwide.17 Ji
Deok-yeong and Kim Dong-jun, owners of the Seoul-based Myeongbo Cinema and Paramount
Cinema respectively, and alternate presidents of the Korean Theatre Association throughout the
1960s, between them represented the interests of exhibitors, who reached a nationwide total of 597
in 1969.18
In this way, demand from regional exhibitors stimulated producers to increase the size and
frequency of their output. Usually, exhibitors advanced about 60% of the production budget to
producers in exchange for exclusive rights – paying up to a further 30% on receiving the film
print.19 Buffered by this economically reciprocal funding scheme, producers were exposed to very
little risk.20 In addition, in some cases producers were able to secure pre-sales funding in excess of
the total production budget, in which case the excess went straight into their coffers.21
Exhibitor-investors also influenced the production environment in similar ways to the impact of
“New York Bankers” in Hollywood – at least as it was understood at the time.22 Ultimately,
producers became overly dependent on pre-sales investments, and thus failed to develop a range of
other funding sources. This exposed the industry to being unduly influenced by exhibitors in
making decisions about favored film genres and styles.23 By the late 1960s, the film market was
oversupplied with product, mostly quota quickies – “cheap second-rate domestic films”.24 Faced
with this flush of lower quality films, exhibitors had difficulty earning high yields on their
investments. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that exhibitors began passing bad cheques
to producers.25 As a result, the flow of funding for productions came to an abrupt halt, resulting in
an unprecedented downturn for the industry.26 Today, producers run the film industry with far
greater transparency and accountability than was the case in the 1960s.
There were two major industry organizations operating at this time: the KMPPA (Korean Motion
Pictures Producers Association), which became a powerful trade association that advanced the
business interests of its members – the cartel of registered producers; and the MPAK (Motion
Picture Association of Korea), which represented the remaining members of the industry.27
Although there was no ceiling set for membership of the KMPPA, the MPI controlled the
organization’s size by making frequent changes to the PRS which kept the number of registered
http://japanfocus.org/-Brian-Yecies/3875?rand=1356367174&...
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producers at a small but optimal level, resulting in constantly fluctuating numbers.
Most previous scholarship has viewed the introduction of the PRS as part of the Park government’s
larger industrialization agenda, and has seen the compulsory nature of the scheme as a harmful
influence on the industry.28 By contrast, other studies have linked the development of the PRS to
the Hollywood studio system, showing how a small number of registered producers such as
Hanguk Yesul and Donga Heungeop attempted to mimic Hollywood’s practice of vertical
integration – despite their ultimate failure due to lack of capital and a disorganized distribution
system.29 Both views offer food for thought.
In the US in the 1940s, a group of elite studio owners ran their Hollywood studios as “a system of
corporations”,30 asserting their (business-oriented) “creative control and administrative
authority”31 over filmmaking. Similarly the PRS model concentrated power among a small cartel
of producers, and the KMPPA operated as an oligopoly similar to the US trade association, the
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). However, in Korea, although producers had the
right to distribute films, in effect exhibitors had much more say over the distribution process – that
is, over the choice of films for public screening and their exhibition venues. Producers had to deal
with at least six exhibitors when making decisions about the distribution of a particular film. These
practical constraints illustrate the vulnerability and political impotence experienced by the Korean
film industry under the authoritarian military regime of the 1960s. While the Hollywood studio
system allowed major studios such as Fox Film Corporation, Paramount Pictures, Universal
Pictures and Columbia Pictures (all controlling members of the MPAA) to control the bulk of the
U.S. market, the KMPPA (and PRS) remained a much less stable and predictable entity than the
MPAA.
However, the cartel or oligopoly that emerged out of the PRS was a mixture of two models: the
family-business-oriented chaebol and the Hollywood studio system. The chaebol concept grew out
of Japan’s prewar zaibatsu system, which enabled a few large family-run vertically integrated
business conglomerates – in the automobile, iron/steel, and heavy chemicals industries, for
instance – to exert a significant influence on the nation’s economy.32 Resembling the chaebol, but
on a much smaller scale, the PRS overemphasized the role of production, which was a direct
outcome of developmental state policy.33 Buttressing the film industry in this way reflected the
ways in which Park “mixed the Japanese ethos of top-down mobilization and the U.S. ideas of
technocracy with Korean nationalism in most un-Japanese and un-American ways to clear the way
for economic growth”.34
Through the PRS, and comparable to initiatives launched by other countries such as Britain, Japan,
India, and China, the Korean government attempted to build a national film studio system based on
current industry practices in the U.S. As a spokesperson for the KMPPA, producer/director Shin
Sang-ok strongly advocated the benefits of industrialization, seeking to influence amendments to
the MPL that would enable his own production company, Shin Film, to function more like
Columbia Pictures. While Shin may have referred to Columbia Pictures as the kind of studio he
wished to create, he also learned how Japanese film studios operated while forming relationships
with two of them, Daiei and Toho.35 In the process, it became clear to Shin that the Japanese film
industry was built on the Hollywood studio system.
For its part, the Park regime may have had at least one eye on the Japanese film industry, which
had been thriving in both domestic and overseas markets since the 1950s. Under his government’s
direction, the studio system in Korea flourished – despite the weakening of the studio system in
Hollywood and Japan during the 1960s. This late adoption of the studio system facilitated the
http://japanfocus.org/-Brian-Yecies/3875?rand=1356367174&...
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government’s control over the industry because studios had to work within its directives in order to
keep in business. The efforts of Shin and the Korean government were recognized in U.S. trade
reports that considered the stage of development reached by the Korean film industry as
“comparable to early Hollywood, with players under contract to the various studios”.36
Despite some similarities between the structure of Korea’s PRS and the major studio system in
Hollywood (a “mature oligopoly – a group of companies cooperating to control a certain
market”,37) the effects of centralized policy intervention in Korea – and the resultant artificial
shaping of the industry’s development – made the Korean system very different from Hollywood.
In particular, given that the PRS had been designed as a production-centric industry system, the
neglect of exhibition and distribution became a serious barrier to vertical integration.
Taming Producers with “Carrots on a Stick”
Throughout the 1960s, the PRS served as the key mechanism for shaping and controlling the film
industry. Registration status was kept current by members meeting the new criteria announced with
each policy modification. Producers seemed to be constantly catching up with these ever-changing
requirements, giving rise to the oft-used metaphor of a carrot on a stick. Striving to strike a realistic
balance between profit-taking and policy demands, registered producers engaged in three key
strategies: trading rights to produce a film (daemyeong jejak in Korean); trading rights to import a
film (under the Import License Reward System, discussed below); and generating film pre-sales.
By continually introducing new industry specifications, the MPI was able to influence (and elevate)
industry standards while regulating the number of producers and the day-to-day conduct of their
activities. However, as discussed below, the MPI’s influence in such matters was only partially
effective, as a surprising number of unregistered (aka independent) producers found ways to
circumvent the system. This was a relatively easy task given the industry’s small size and
collegiality; almost everyone knew everyone else.
 
Daemyeong jejak (hereafter daemyeong) was a widespread subcontracting system that emerged at
the end of 1961. It enabled a registered producer to remain competitive by meeting stringent
registration requirements while simultaneously facilitating – theoretically illegal – filmmaking
opportunities for independent producers (deemed illegal after the PRS was launched in 1962).
Subcontracting of this kind involved a four-step process.
First, in a move beneficial to both parties, a registered producer gave (and later sold) independent
producers the right to make films by letting them use his name (registered status) in order to file the
necessary paperwork and to get approval for production. Second, the independent producers – who
included names such as Ho Hyeon-chan and Choi Hyeon-min, and directors Yu Hyun-mok and
Jeong So-yeong – made their films using their own or the registered producer’s networks and
equipment, opening the way to substantial box office profits without the large investment necessary
for official registration. 38
Third, from 1963 the independent producer would return the favor by paying a commission to the
registered producer, and the film’s box office profits would go into the former’s pockets.39 When a
daemyeong film was screened, the opening credits identified two types of producers: the producer-
in-charge (jejak damdang or chong jihwi, referring to the independent producer) and the producer
(jejak, referring to the registered producer). This acknowledgement suggested that the practice,
albeit illegal, was widespread and recognized by those involved in the industry. Finally, the film in
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question was submitted to the MPI’s film awards process, an arrangement which exclusively
benefitted the registered producer if successful as the “prize” was a license to import and distribute
a foreign film – a sure formula for generating lucrative box office returns.
Whilst this semi-covert activity – initially conducted without the exchange of money – was an
unintended consequence of the PRS and therefore fell outside the government’s blueprint for the
industry, it became critical to the sustainability of the producers’ cartel and the industry as a whole.
In 1963, the rate of daemyeong-funded productions increased rapidly after amendments to the
MPL required registered producers to make a minimum of fifteen films per year. Simply put, it was
a valuable tool that enabled registered producers to meet the increasing demands of the PRS.
Eventually, the daemyeong system became so entrenched that the MPI acquiesced in its operation,
demonstrating how at least those filmmakers with the right networks persevered by following
multiple pathways for survival and success under the Park regime.
As part of this changing environment, in 1964 the MPAK increased the level of its complaints
against registered producers exploiting their independent colleagues.40 Despite this, the
daemyeong system continued to grow. Trade reports estimate that, in 1965, 130 out of 189 new
films were daemyeong productions, meaning that two-thirds of all films produced in Korea at this
time were completed by “dubious” means.41 In reality, these figures indicated that few if any
registered producers had been able to produce the statutory minimum of fifteen films per year that
the MPL required.42 The MPI did not hinder daemyeong because the practice was clearly
beneficial in enabling the industry to reach a desired level of productivity, rising rapidly from 86
films in 1961 to 189 in 1965.43
However, the end of the system was not far away. In 1966, the same year that Korea’s screen quota
was launched, the MPI formally banned daemyeong because it was no longer needed as a
mechanism for generating productivity. The government was satisfied with current levels of
productivity, and set an annual production figure for the industry of 120 films – a target easily
achievable by the registered producers alone. Nevertheless, daemyeong continued, but with
escalating costs for independent producers as a result of the lower number of productions
permitted.44 Few unregistered producers could afford to stay in the game, and a handful even took
their own lives out of a growing sense of despair.45
In response to ongoing organized protests over the new production regime, the KMPPA agreed to
eliminate the annual quota limit and daemyeong was legalized by the MPI.46 In responses,
production numbers soared from 172 in 1967 to 229 in 1969.47
About 80% of the films produced in 1971 were daemyeong films, mostly low quality “quota
quickies,” and all 21 registered producers were involved in daemyeong productions, with a
maximum of eight films each, reaffirming the widespread utilization of the system.48 Ironically, the
government’s acceptance of the industry’s call for loosening of controls undermined the production
environment, eventually leading to a dark age (throughout the 1970s) for Korean cinema.
Cinema of Deterrence
Finally, the MPI enacted two related measures which were aimed at deterring the number of film
imports entering Korea and restricting their exhibition: the Import Recommendation System (IRS)
and the Import License Reward System (ILRS). These two schemes were used alongside the
Screen Quota System, which the MPI introduced in 1966, to curtail the powerful influence that
http://japanfocus.org/-Brian-Yecies/3875?rand=1356367174&...
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Figure 4. Monkey Goes West (1966) film
advertisement from Gyeonghyang Daily 8
August 1966: 8. This Shaw Brothers’
production made under the direction of Ho
Meng-hua was falsely presented to
audiences in Korea by Shin Film as a
co-production co-directed by Im Won-sik.
foreign films were commanding at the box office.49 Given that the majority of foreign feature films
exhibited at this time were American, Hollywood distributors were effected the most by this policy.
The IRS required importers to submit a list of films to the MPI for approval. During this process,
content regulation was carried out on two fronts: firstly, through the self-censorship imposed by the
importers themselves and secondly, through the MPI’s screening process of potential films for
import. The chief criterion used by the MPI was a moral and cultural one – whether a particular
film would be harmful or offensive to Korea’s customs and manners.
Linked to the IRS, which served as the government’s primary import control tool, the ILRS
functioned as a financial subsidy for the registered producers. The system was designed to
administer licenses based on five criteria: quantity of films produced; quality of production; the
existence of a successful export contract; formal co-production status; and submissions to
international film festivals and awards received. Each time a producer met any one of these criteria
he was eligible to receive a license to import one film.50
In response, registered producers devised two covert ways of obtaining import licenses and/or
exploiting them for profit: firstly, by falsifying or faking official documents such as domestic film
export licenses and international co-production contracts; and secondly, by selling an import
license to another registered producer. From early on, producers freely engaged in these two illegal
and so-called black market strategies. The idea of selling import rights was especially appealing to
those registered producers who were prolific filmmakers and/or frequent recipients of foreign film
festival nominations and awards, but who were unfamiliar with the import/export side of the
business.51
Spurred by the big profits to be made, illegal import agencies became very active, purchasing
import licenses from registered producers for 3 to 6 million won each and then negotiating with
American film distributors (based in Japan) on their behalf.52
In most cases, export prices for a single film varied
between about US$5,000 and US$10,000,
including royalty and printmaking fees.53 In other
cases, however, films were exported for as little as
$100 in order to generate the necessary paperwork
that would enable a registered producer to receive
an import license.54 While the falsification of
export figures was on the rise throughout the
1960s, the MPI took little action to curtail the
process because it lacked the resources to monitor
activities that were happening on such a large
scale.
With the rising popularity of martial arts films,
there was strong competition among registered
producers to import Hong Kong films. They were
significantly cheaper than Hollywood films and
performed equally well at the box office. One of
the easiest ways to import a Hong Kong film was
by informing the MPI that the film in question was
a Korean–Hong Kong co-production. Apparently,
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Shin Sang-ok was subsequently charged
with fraud and violating tariff regulations.
Shin and Korean actor Park No-sik,
promoted as a leading character in the film,
were summoned to the state prosecutors’
office in Seoul, and interrogated over the
affair. To convince the MPI (and viewers) of
their bona fides, close-ups of Park No-sik’s
face had been inserted into the film at
appropriate points; Park had spent three
days in Hong Kong shooting the required
scenes.
Figure 5. Valley of the Fangs
(1970) film advertisement
from Donga Daily 6 October
1970: 6. This is another ‘fake
co-production’ that was
introduced in Korea by Shin
film as a way of boosting
domestic output in order to
gain the advantages
promised under new film
policy regulations. 
Hong Kong production houses such as the Shaw
Brothers willingly agreed to assist Korean
producers by forging co-production contracts, even
though these deals involved the selling of their
films to Korea.55 The practice of faking
international co-production contracts lasted until
the early 1980s.56 Sometimes, a short scene with a
random Korean actor was inserted into a film, as in
the Shaw Brothers’ Monkey Goes West (1966) and
Valley of the Fangs (1970) – in order to give some
semblance of a co-production.
In short, registered
producers resorted to a variety of tricks and schemes to obtain
import licenses, especially as the ability to import Hollywood films
brought with it the opportunity for lucrative box-office takings and
increased profits for production-distribution companies. The
producers, or importers working on their behalf, contacted
Hollywood agencies based in Japan such as Warner Brothers and
negotiated the films to be imported as well as prices; such deals
usually included a two-year distribution period, royalties, and
expenses for prints and freight.57
In 1968, 18 Korean import agencies including Donga Export
Corporation, Hwacheon Corporation and Samyeong handled
around 90% of foreign film imports (about 50 films out of 60).58
Although the number of domestic films exhibited in Korea
outnumbered foreign films at this time, foreign productions
consistently drew larger audiences.
By the mid-1960s, foreign films, which were exhibited for two or
three times as long as Korean films, were outperforming domestic
films at the box office on a regular basis.59 A new generation of
young filmgoers born after the end of the Japanese colonial era in
1945 believed that the narrative and aesthetic qualities of foreign
films were superior to the local product.60 Hong Kong martial arts
films, “spaghetti” westerns and James Bond action films were
especially popular with this group, generating much larger profits
than ever before. For example, although the number of foreign and
domestic films screened in 1968 in Seoul was 80 and 204
respectively, the audiences for foreign films left local films in the
shade: in that year the average audience for foreign and domestic
films reached 107,269 and 40,271 respectively.61
This two-headed import policy substantially subsidized the
industry. At the same time, it encouraged registered producers to
follow government guidelines as though they were chasing a carrot
on a stick.
In less than five years, the MPI’s PRS, censorship guidelines, and import regulations enabled the
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Park government to shape and control the film industry as it had done for the automobile and iron
and steel industries.62 The Park government wielded increasing power over the film industry,
seeing the potential of cinema as an important vehicle for disseminating national ideology as it did
in these other industries. Preventing the exhibition of noncompliant films was a key aspect of film
policy during Park’s tenure as president, thus completing the harnessing of film production,
distribution and exhibition to his political agenda as a propaganda tool.
Despite the draconian structure created by the MPI’s three main policy components, throughout the
Park period members of the film industry – in particular the Motion Picture Association of Korea,
representing those operatives not covered by the registered producers’ body, the Korean Motion
Picture Producers Association – offered resistance wherever and whenever they could. On behalf
of the great majority of the film community – including directors, cinematographers, actors, and
independent (unregistered) producers – the MPAK consistently lobbied for the abolition of the
MPL. In particular, it challenged the MPI over the PRS and daemyeong processes by appealing to
the National Assembly as early as March 1964, on the grounds that daemyeong strengthened the
privileged cartel of registered producers. The anti-MPL campaign was a bold sign of the industry’s
readiness to stand up to bullying from the MPI (and the Park government more generally), and
resistance spearheaded by the MPAK continued sporadically throughout the 1960s.
Conclusion
The golden age of cinema in Hollywood (1929-1945) has been defined as a period marked by
exceptional films, and the time when sound film was perfected as an “influential business, cultural
product and art form”.63 Similarly, the golden age of French cinema in the 1930s has been
characterized as the age of production, auteurs, star actors, and the use of literary texts for
filmmaking.64 According to these critiques, the term “golden age” refers to a period when cinema
reaches the point of being appreciated as the combined product of art, business and technology.
The same notion can readily be applied to Korea’s golden age of cinema in the 1960s, a time when
the film industry underwent rapid industrialization under the Park Chung Hee dictatorship, raised
production values, and experienced the advent of new auteurs and their works. Yet, at the crux of
this development was a cartel of powerful producers, whose various business models shaped and
sustained the film industry.
During the Golden Age of the 1960s, Korean cinema was largely defined by dynamic power
struggles which brought the government and the film industry together in often conflictual ways as
producers, both registered and independent, sought to assert some measure of independence for
themselves and the industry as a whole. Today, while some of the business strategies adopted by
1960s filmmakers may seem absurd and retrogressive, we can see that they were responding to
specific problems and that their solutions were effective at the time. Their desire to achieve and
retain their status as producers provided a dynamic motivation that gave a powerful impetus to the
film industry as a whole. Money and the promise of prosperity drove productivity, allowing the
local industry to enjoy its first true golden age.
By examining this early golden age of Korean cinema from a political-economic angle, the authors
have attempted to provide a more complex discussion of national cinema and its links to policy and
the production side of the industry than has previously been achieved. One of the central claims of
this study is that the golden age of the 1960s was the outcome of a combination of a protectionist
film policy and state control, and the new production system that resulted from these
circumstances.
Under the direction of Park Chung Hee’s military regime, the MPI achieved near-total
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administrative control over production, exhibition, import and export activities with the aim of
converting the film industry into a propaganda factory. The Ministry engaged in two types of overt
propaganda – a two-pronged weapon consisting of the direct propaganda produced by the NFPC,
composed of newsreels and short message films, and the more oblique material produced by the
private film industry such as anticommunist and ideologically driven (“enlightenment”) feature
films, all directed by the exigencies of the MPL. While a range of contemporary Korean
filmmakers continues to make films dealing with cultural patriotism and national issues, the use of
“propaganda” is infinitely more subtle than in the past.
In the 1960s, some important differences existed between Korea’s PRS and the Hollywood studio
system. In Korea, the studio system was created by the state. Following the regime’s emphasis on
productivity, the PRS was designed to create a production-centric industry system, neglecting
exhibition and distribution, and thus vertical integration in any real sense was obstructed – a
significant deficit in the industrial development model proposed by an authoritarian military
regime.
Hence, the policy framework and interventions put in place by the Park regime were never totally
effective or successful. In response to these government moves, the industry developed various
coping mechanisms and reactive strategies, such as sharing equipment and staff when being
inspected for compliance with infrastructure criteria. While the industry grew in size as a result of
the PRS system, its heavy focus on the production arm led to the relative neglect of other areas
such as distribution and exhibition, leading to unbalanced development. Producers devised various
less-than-transparent methods for dealing with the pressures they faced, creating a daemyeong
system and exploiting the ILRS. These back-door deals and black market ties have been left far
behind in 2000s, as the industry has become increasingly transparent and efficient, especially in
financial matters, and has suffered less intervention from the government – especially since the
Kim Dae-jung administration’s adoption of the principle of “support without control”.
The rise of an elite producers cartel and the systematization of their operating methods in the 1960s
was partly a by-product of the Park regime’s policy of supporting chaebols – family-run business
conglomerates. Both the PRS and chaebols were products of a developmentalist state policy. In
favoring chaebols, Park and his followers selected and nurtured industrial elites based on factors
such as personal connections and proven records of business performance. In return, the chaebols
spearheaded the government’s export drive, which was also a critical part of the production side of
the industry. However, while the film industry shares many similarities with chaebols in terms of
its development pattern, there are also differences between them: chaebols still continue to operate
in Korea, while the PRS disappeared in the 1980s. The chaebols and their legacy have survived for
three main reasons: the government became overly dependent on them for economic reasons; the
chaebols by contrast became progressively less dependent on the government; and their leaders
remained in their posts while political regimes changed around them.65
The PRS was eventually abolished in 1984, when anyone became free to open a production
company by reporting their intentions to the Ministry of Culture and Athletics (now called the
Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism). Then in the late 1990s and early 2000s – within the
country’s developed market economy system – three major companies were responsible for the
first sustained attempt at vertical integration within the Korean film industry: CJ Entertainment,
Showbox, and Lotte Entertainment. Without the threat of government intervention hanging over
them, the influence of these three companies increased rapidly. As the center of private funding for
the industry, and covering all three key areas (production, distribution and exhibition), this major
new conglomerate is continuing to stimulate the growth of a stronger and more powerful “studio
system” in Korea.
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Notes
1 The authors thank Mark Morris and the journal’s referees for their valuable suggestions as well as
Korean film maestro Darcy Paquet for his insights on producing in the new millennium. The Korea
Foundation and Academy of Korean Studies have provided valuable assistance for this work in
progress.
2 An increasing number of Korean producers, directors, actors, and post-production specialists are
leaving their mark on films made in China. For example, Korean digital visual effects (VFX) firms
operating in China contributed to Tsui Hark’s 2010 martial arts drama Detective Dee and the
Mystery of the Phantom Flame; and his 3D film Flying Swords of Dragon Gate, produced in 2011.
Korea’s Digital Idea shared the visual effects award for the latter film at the 31st Hong Kong Film
Awards. Hur Jin-ho directed two films in China with Beijing-based producer Zonbo Media: A
Good Rain Knows (2009) and Dangerous Liaisons (2012). CJ Powercast, Next Visual Studio and
Lollol Media completed the VFX and 2D/3D digital intermediary for the Ningxia/Dinglongda
/Huayi Brothers’ fantasy-action film directed by Wuershan – currently the highest grossing
domestic film ever in China. Also, An Byung-ki, producer of Speed Scandal (2008) and Sunny
(2011), both box office hits in China, directed the horror film Bunshinsaba (2012) in China. In
Hollywood, Lee Byung Hun (G.I. Joe: The Rise of the Cobra (2009) and G.I. Joe: Retaliation
(2013)) and Bae Doona (Cloud Atlas (2012)) have starred in blockbusters, while Park Chan-wook
and Kim Jee-woon have directed Stoker (2013) and The Last Stand (2013) respectively. These are
just a few examples of the collaborative inroads Koreans have been making in the film worlds in
China and the US.
3 Sadly, this high-concept blockbuster film, starring Zhang Ziyi of Crouching Tiger, Hidden
Dragon (2000) fame, failed at the box office partly due to its release a few days before the 11
September attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York.
4 The results of this annual Cine21 survey can be found in Lee (4 May 2006) and Moon (3 May
2007). After leaving Sidus FNH in 2009, Tcha’s former company began concentrating on
distribution and exhibition rather than production, for which Tcha had been well known.
5 Since the mid-to-late 2000s, various arms of the Korean film industry have been besotted with
China. Shooting on location in China’s vast and inspiring landscapes, casting stars for wide or
international audience appeal, and pursuing a range of official (joint and assisted) and unofficial
collaborative co-productions are all factors that have helped the Korean film industry gain access
to China’s massive and fast-growing market. Without question, the personal networks (guanxi) that
Korean students at the Beijing Film Academy have developed in China since enrolling in this
prestigious institution from the early 1990s – serving as local liaisons and consultants for both
industries – have been invaluable to this process. Hence, Korean film companies and individual
practitioners have thus far made stronger inroads into China than Hollywood, once believed to be
the sole center of cinematic fame and success.
6 Patrick Frater, 10 May 2012. “CJ reassures over problem films.” Film Business Asia.
Available here. Accessed 14 November 2012.
7 Readers may be reminded here of the power shift in producing that is occurring in other parts of
the world such as China, where internationally renowned Fifth Generation Chinese filmmaker
Zhang Yimou unexpectedly split with his long-time producer of 15 years, Zhang Weiping, in
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October 2012, citing conflicts between the creative and business demands of filmmaking. Staff
Reporter. 8 October 2012. “Zhang Yimou splits with long-term collaborator.”
WantChinaTimes.com Available here. Accessed 14 November 2012.
8 See Lee and Choe (1988); Ho (2000); Byon (2001); Lee (2004); Park (2005); McHugh and
Abelmann (2005); and Yi, Jung, and Park (2005).
9 Here we specifically refer to the massive “landmark volume” edited by Kim and Vogel (2011),
and its smaller companion edited by Kim and Sorensen (2011).
10 Other detailed accounts of Park Chung-hee’s legacy such as Kim (2004) and Lee (2006) also
suffer from this oversight.
11 Rubin 1971: 81.
12 Park’s colonial experience is an important factor in this regard. Park was born in 1917, seven
years after the Japanese colonized Korea. He was educated as a Japanese military officer in
Manchukuo in 1940 under Japanese colonial authority which continued in Korea until 1945. As a
military dictator, like the Japanese colonial authorities he would have prioritized issues of national
security and civil control above all else. It is no secret that Park deeply admired Japan’s Meiji
imperial restoration responsible for Japan’s modernization, and also that he was profoundly
influenced by Japanese colonial and military traditions. He once stated that ‘the case of the Meiji
imperial restoration will be of great help to the performance of our own revolution. My interest in
this direction remains strong and constant’ (1963: 121). (For discussions of Park’s colonial
experience and its long-term effects on his thinking, see Yi 2002; Yi 2003; and Moon and Jun
2011).
13 These guidelines were supplemented in two further ministerial decrees: the MPL Enforcement
Ordinance (promulgated in March 1962) and the MPL Enforcement Rules (July 1962), consisting
of fifteen and seven articles respectively. During the 1960s, the government released a series of
film policy amendments through this hierarchical legislative framework.
14 For a discussion of the impact of censorship on directing and genre choice – that is, as a
determinant of which types of films were made and how stories were expressed within
particular narrative and aesthetic conventions – see Shim (2011).
15 Yeonghwa Japji (Film Magazine). December 1967: 226-229.
16 Yeonghwa Japji (Film Magazine). January 1970: 148.
17 This number was limited to six until 1988. In 1989, the number of prints allowed to circulate at
any one time was increased to twelve, and between 1990 and 1993 this figure increased by one
print per year. In 1994, this restriction was abolished, enabling films to be released on a nationwide
basis, thus improving market conditions for both domestic and international films during this
pre-multiplex rollout era. See Ahn (2005: 296-297).
18 Gukje Yeonghwasa (International Film Co.) 1969: 201.
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19 For a detailed historical overview of Korea’s film distribution system, see Kim et al. (2003).
20 Members of the U.S. film industry would have been made aware of this practice through articles
published in Variety such as “No Union Spells E-c-o-no-m-i-c-a-l; All 11 Producers as Studio
Owners” (8 May 1968).
21 In a few cases – for example, as a result of securing pre-sales funding from multiple exhibitors,
each from a different province – a producer was required to contribute not more than 8% of the
total budget (Kim et al. 2003: 12-24).
22 See Wade (1969: 10).
23 A similar phenomenon has occurred in the contemporary film industry in Korea. Between 2003
and 2005 Japanese distributors such as Shochiku, Comstock, and Gaga Communications rushed to
purchased Korean films even before they were completed, accounting for between 70% and 80%
of all Korean film exports and leaving Korean producers over-reliant on the Japanese market.
24 Standish 1994: 73.
25 Geundae Yeonghwa (Modern Film) December 1971: 23-31.
26 Other industries also ran into trouble around this time. Between 1969 and 1971, over 300
firms either went bankrupt or were on the verge of bankruptcy, desperately seeking state loans
to bail them out. See Cumings (1997: 362-363).
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